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ABSTRACT 
 Since 1992, the General Accountability Office placed the DoD contract 
management on the high-risk list due to the workforce’s lack of training, experience, and 
education. Their report found that budget constraints in the mid-1990s forced the DoD to 
reduce the acquisition workforce. The DoD began rebuilding its acquisition workforce in 
2009. The Army founded the Army Contract Command (ACC) in 2008 to address issues 
in the contracting workforce. The ACC developed the 51C Proficiency Guide Assessment 
in 2010 and replaced the training guidance in 2019 with the 51C Job Aid. 
 The purpose of this research was to identify the training requirements in each 
contracting environment including home-station, short-duration deployments, and 
long-duration deployments. This study used 22 of the 29 contract training tasks from the 
Job Aid and contracting data from the ACC Business Analyst Division to analyze the 
differences in tasks experienced between contracting environments. We captured the 
differences in each environment by accounting for the frequency of tasks performed in 
the environment. 
 We concluded that the tasks performed in each contracting environment with 
varying frequency. The tasks contracting personnel executed in home-station were 
significantly different than the tasks they performed in deployment. Our study suggests 
that Army contracting should consider developing separate training plans that address 
tasks required to perform in each contracting environment. 
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A. PROJECT SUMMARY  
The study used the Army Contract Command (ACC) 51C Job Aid to assess the 
training gaps among the contracting environments: home-station, long duration, and short 
duration. The study used the Job Aid to quantify the contracting tasks performed in each 
environment. The training strategy from the Job Aid states that newly assessed contracting 
soldiers should have 12 months of home-station experience to gain proficiency before 
deployments. This research sought to determine if there were training differences among 
the three different contracting environments.  
This study initially proposed to evaluate the training gaps among each environment; 
however, the team could not measure gaps directly. The study acquired data from the ACC 
Business Analyst Division (BAD), which provided contracting records from the three 
environments during the timeframe spanning 2008–2018. The study used task occurrence 
and the frequency of those tasks to determine the difference in each contracting 
environment. The tasks that were more likely to occur in a deployed environment than a 
home-station environment indicated potential training gaps, as a result, the study updated 
its research questions: are the environments different for the contracting officer, how 
different are the environments, and how important is the difference in the environments? 
The study was able to answer all three questions with varying degrees of certainty.  
B. BACKGROUND  
The ACC published its initial training guidance in the 2010 51C Proficiency Guide 
Assessment (PGA). The guide included 29 training tasks, mentorship guidance, and a 
follow-on online assessment to gauge proficiency in the ACC 51C workforce. In 2019, the 
ACC retired the PGA and updated its training program to publish the 51C Job Aid that 
encompassed required training tasks as well as guidance on mentorship and assessment. 
Both the 51C PGA and Job Aid required senior civilian and military personnel to train and 
assess 51C proficiency. As noted from a 2007 Department of the Army (DA) report, only 
53% of civilians and 56% of military contracting personnel met certification requirements 
xvi 
for their current contracting positions. The DA highlighted that the Army Acquisition 
community did not have enough trained and experienced personnel to lead and mentor the 
workforce. In a 2012 study, Abbruzzese concluded there is a lack of properly skilled 
civilian workforce to mentor and train newly assessed contracting soldiers. The ACC also 
had to ensure personnel had the skillsets for their positions. Each contracting position is 
different and requires a unique set of skills. A study conducted by McMillon (2000) found 
that home-station contracting tasks do not prepare contracting officers for the tasks they 
perform in the deployed environment.  
C. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION  
The first question the study attempted to answer was, “Are the environments 
different with respect to tasks performed?” The study developed two hypotheses. The null 
hypothesis was that all three environments are equal. The alternative hypothesis was that 
none of the environments were equal when the study compared the environments against 
each other. To test the hypotheses, the study used the Pearson’s Chi-squared test. The study 
found that the environments were different. The data shows that the likelihood of 
performing any specific task varied by environment. Likelihood percentages varied as 
much as 25% for a specific task. The study was able to reject the null hypothesis with a 
high level of statistical confidence.  
The second question the study attempted to answer was, how different are the three 
environments? The study used the likelihood comparison test to evaluate the likelihood 
between tasks. Most tasks more likely to occur in short-duration and long-duration 
environments than home-station. The study was able to examine 22 tasks of the total 29 
tasks listed in the Job Aid. Of the 22 tasks from the Job Aid, 19 tasks are more likely to 
occur in a long-duration environment versus home-station. Of the 22 tasks, 15 tasks were 
more likely to occur in a short-duration environment versus home-station.  
The final question the study answered was, how important are the differences? The 
study used dollars as a proxy for criticality or the importance. The study ranked the 22 
tasks from most critical to least critical. Generally, the capstone assumed the more 
expensive tasks were more critical.  
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D. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The results from this study will aid contracting commanders in developing a 
training plan to address weak areas based on the findings of this report.  
The capstone study recommended considered criticality in addition to the frequency 
it is performing. A future study could explore additional metrics to measure criticality as 
well as the difficulty of performing the tasks. Future capstone studies could explore the 
amount of repetitions a soldier would need to complete to master a task. A final suggestion 
is to conduct the analysis of alternatives to determine the best incentives to grow and retain 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Prior research identified concerns in whether the contracting battalion’s annual 
training plans accurately address contracting requirements in the three main environment 
environments: home-station, short-duration deployment, and long-duration deployment 
(McMillion 2000; Campbell 1993). In 2010, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) 
Headquarters (HQ) developed the 51C Proficiency Guide Assessment (PGA), a training 
aid, to guide ACC subordinate units’ training requirements. ACC HQ published the 51C 
PGA to provide standardization for training and assessment across the ACC (Army 
Contracting Command [ACC] 2010). In 2019, ACC HQ published the 51C Job Aid to 
replace the 51C Proficiency Guide to coincide with the release with the ACC’s new 
proficiency process model (ACC 2019). The proficiency process model requires senior 
contracting leaders to train and mentor junior contracting soldiers. Both the PGA and the 
Job Aid made a fundamental assumption that a soldier would get the contracting experience 
needed in the first year of her home-station assignment to accomplish her missions in the 
other environments (ACC 2010; ACC 2019). 
If the profiles are different in the three different theaters, it is not clear how well 
the ACC training guidance addressed the different tasks profiles. As a result, training plans 
may not have included realistic contingency training. For example, when a contracting 
officer conducts market research in the U.S. they have accessibility to a wide range of tools 
to provide a synopsis on the cost of a product versus conducting market research in 
deployment. There may be little to no information about the local market due to the lack 
of database systems. Therefore, contracting professionals may not have been prepared for 
deployments to long-duration deployment and short-duration deployment environments. 
This capstone study offers an analysis of the root causes of proficiency issues that may 
exist within the ACC. Commanders may need to tailor training plans for each environment. 




This capstone study will provide Contracting Commanders with a qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of the current Job Aid. The Job Aid is a comprehensive training 
tool that identified the 29 essential tasks ACC determined a contracting officer will train 
to accomplish worldwide contracting operations. The study is an opportunity to provide an 
objective comparison between each environment that would provide commanders with a 
quantitative historical analysis of contracting actions. We used data from 546,364 records 
across 70 DODAACs to identify current and future training trends. Analysis of individual 
DOCAACs showed where units have historically over and undertrained critical job aid 
tasks. It also compared these actions to the dollar amounts as a metric to classify their 
criticality and importance. This capstone study’s objectives were to answer the following 
questions for commanders:  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(1) Are the operating environments (home-station, long-duration deployment, 
short-duration deployment) different? 
The Job Aid assumption has been that work in home-station prepares soldiers for 
work overseas, implying that tasks occur at near equal frequencies in all three 
environments. Equal performance in all three environments would serve as the study’s Null 
Hypothesis (Ho). Proof of unequal task frequency would support the Alternative 
Hypothesis (Ha) and reject the Ho. Rejecting the Ho would validate that the task frequency 
in each environment is not the same.  
(2) If the tasks performed are different in each environment, then what were 
the task frequency differences? 
Each environment had a different number of contract actions performed. To 
compare them, the capstone group needed a way to address the difference in volumes. The 
ratio of every time a contracting officer performed the task in an environment compared to 
the total number of contract actions in that environment enabled comparisons between the 
environments. The task ratios described how likely a contracting worker performed a task 
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given a contract action. Inter-environment differences in task ratios indicated a potential 
for under or over-training. 
(3) How much does the difference matter? 
The capstone group used dollars as a proxy for importance. When a task occurred, and the 
data reflected an obligation, the capstone study assigned the absolute value of the obligation to that 
task. The capstone study investigated obligations in excess when the expected value was different 
than we expected based on the frequency of the task. We explored infrequent tasks that obligated 
a large percentage of dollars as areas of risk. The capstone study’s has rationalized that infrequently 
performed tasks are unlikely to be well-trained. Infrequent tasks cost large amounts of money that 
lead to salient risk.  
4 




Two studies, The Department of Defense study in 1985 and the Packard 
Commission study in 1986, both indicated that the DoD Acquisition workforce was 
untrained and inexperienced in their acquisition responsibilities (Thomas 1986). These two 
studies led to Congressional establishment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) in the fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act 
(H.R.4739). Although Congress implemented the law in 1991, the untrained and 
inexperienced issues continued to persist in the Army Acquisition Corps. According to a 
2007 Department of the Army reform report, only 53% of civilians and 56% of military 
contracting personnel met certification requirements for their current contracting positions 
(DA 2007). Although the studies identified training issues since 1985, these issues 
continued to persist for the last 20 years.  
Formed in 2008, the ACC develops, field, and sustain major weapon systems and 
services that provide soldiers with capabilities to accomplish the nation’s military mission 
(USAASC 2019). The ACC published the PGA as the training guidance for contracting 
soldiers. The 51C PGA contained a contracting task guidebook and a series of computer-
based tests that assessed proficiency. The guide contained “basic tasks that all ACC 51Cs 
should be proficient in, and it applies to all ACC 51Cs” (Army Contracting Command 
2010, 1–1). After a year on the job, ACC expected contracting soldiers to pass all the online 
assessments in the 51C PGA to attain proficiency in contracting (ACC 2010).  
In April 2019, ACC HQ released the 51C Job Aid that directed all subordinate ACC 
units to implement the Job Aid training for all personnel within the commands as listed in 
Appendix A. The 51C Job Aid consisted of twenty-nine tasks that military 51C contracting 
officers needed to perform their duties. The Job Aid assisted leaders in developing training 
programs for their contracting organizations. The 51C Job Aid outlined the training 
strategy that met the training and experience requirements outlined by Congress’ DAWIA 
requirements. The 51C Job Aid contains tasks for 51C contracting soldiers complete to 
acquire their DAWIA Contracting Certification Levels I-III (Department of the Army, 
2010). 
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A. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION GUIDANCE 
When a soldier transitions to the Acquisition Corps, soldiers complete their training 
at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) or an approved equivalency program. 
Soldiers transitioning in the contracting career field, 51C, develop proficiency in their 
contracting skills mainly through on-the-job training in their respective units. The 51C Job 
Aid functionally decompose tasks that all military contracting officers accomplish to 
acquire proficiency (Army Contracting Command 2019). Each contracting unit offers 
uniquely challenging yet variable opportunities to excel as contracting officers. No two 
contracting units are the same. Through repetition, soldiers become proficient at certain 
training tasks based on their unit’s mission. The contracting mission and customer needs 
vary from unit to unit. A common misconception is that the home-station on-the-job 
experience is enough to prepare the soldier for short-duration and long-duration deployed 
contracting environments. However, the similarities between routine home-station tasks 
and those tasks common to short-duration deployment and long-duration deployment 
contracting may not be identical.  
The 51C Job Aid does not address the training differences in each environment. 
The Directive Memorandum from ACC Commanding General, Major General Pardew, 
states, “Units, centers, and directorates, shall, to the maximum extent practical, provide 
training opportunities to meet these [Job Aid] requirements” (ACC 2019, 3). The directive 
assumes the Job Aid training prepares contracting professionals for their duties in all 
contracting environments.  
Unlike its predecessor, the PGA, the Job Aid specifically “contains an MOS 
Training Plan that provides the information needed to plan, conduct, and evaluate unit 
training on collective tasks that support unit missions,” and thus is supportive of directed 
unit Mission-Essential Task Lists (METL) (ACC 2019, 8). Like the 51C PGA, the Job Aid 
requires a 12-month learning and integration period, as well as on-the-job experience. A 
senior 51C contracting soldier, MOS 51C, or contracting civilian, job series 1102, 
supervises the 12-month proficiency process. The ACC 51C proficiency process includes 
a continuous cycle of training, assessment, and exercise as shown in Figure 1 (ACC 2019)  
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Figure 1. ACC 51C Proficiency Process. Source: ACC (2019). 
Since the shift from the PGA to the more detailed Job Aid, the assessment method 
for task proficiency remained relatively unchanged. In the Army, military personnel 
transfer from their operational MOS to the acquisition corps. In the acquisition corps, 
military personnel either become a MOS 51A program manager or a MOS 51C contracting 
officer. An ACC unit consists of both civilian, nomenclature 1102, and military personnel, 
MOS 51C. Contracting civilian personnel specialize in contracting immediately. In 
contract, military Army personnel start their careers in the operational military and then 
transition to contracting around seven to ten years into their careers. By contrast, the Air 
Force does not require military contracting officers to transition later in their career. Much 
like the civilian contracting force, Air Force contracting officers immediately start their 
career specializing in contracting. As shown in Figure 1, the Army contracting training 
process required senior military contracting personnel and senior civilian contracting 
personnel to access the proficiency of the contracting workforce.  
B. CONTRACT MANNING ISSUES  
Due to the inherent challenges in military manning (Reed 2010) and available time 
for contract training (Rendon et al. 2012), one may think that contracting expertise and 
leadership should reside in the civilian workforce. Although civilians have more 
experience and may be best suited to be in ACC leadership positions, civilian contracting 
specialists have little to no desire to transition to the position of contracting officers 
8 
(Robinson 2012). Senior Service College student, Undra Robinson (2012), assessed 
civilian contracting specialist’s desire to become contracting officers. Without a steady 
growth of replacement contracting officers, retirements can leave disparities in the 
experience and leadership of the contracting workforce. Through quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, Robinson was able to present statistics and feedback affirming that 
contracting specialists generally prefer not to become contracting officers. Of the 50% of 
respondents who were qualified to become contracting officers, one in every four preferred 
to decline their warrant to become contracting officers. The study found the top three 
reasons civilian contracting specialists declined to become a contracting officer included 
“thankless” work, the job required more hours at work, and the lack of trained specialists 
(Robinson 2012, 26). The military accounts for less than 8% of the acquisition corps 
workforce, while the civilian workforce accounts for 92% (USAASC 2019). Robinson 
provides great insight into how the Army can improve its Job Aid Proficiency model that 
depends on the civilian workforce to train and mentor junior contracting personnel.  
Debra Abbruzzese (2012) published a report for the DAU Senior Service College 
Fellowship titled “Today’s Crisis in Contracting.” Ms. Abbruzzese wrote the report two 
years after ACC HQ adopted the 51C proficiency guide assessment (PGA). ACC leaders 
assumed soldiers would receive training on-the-job under an experienced 1102, civilian 
contracting personnel. She found that there are not enough 1102 contracting personnel 
available to complete the current workload and train the workforce. Abbruzzese explored 
the possibility of offloading the workload from 1102s by hiring some lesser qualified, 
easier to hire workers to take on some tasks. This would afford 1102s more time. She 
asserted that Army contracting organizations had difficulties hiring enough properly skilled 
civilian workers. By extension, there was a lack of qualified 1102s to mentor and train 
newly assessed 51C contracting soldiers. Abbruzzese concluded that the ACC needs 
qualified trainers to identify training gaps as well as train newly transitioned 51C 
contracting soldiers.  
To improve efficiency and increase job satisfaction among the civilian contracting 
workforce (Robinson 2012), the Army should consider assigning qualified contracting 
personnel with the right skills (Abbruzzese 2012) in the right positions. Timothy Reed 
9 
(2010) composed a report that sought to define the composition and size requirements of a 
contracting organization (Reed 2010). Reed questioned if DoD contracting organizations 
developed models that appropriately measured the contracting workload and adequately 
assigned the right number of soldiers to the organization. Reed compared the different 
models across the DoD. He challenged the assumptions DoD services made to develop 
models as well as the validity of the services’ methods (Reed 2010). For instance, the Army 
managed personnel through Tables of Organization Equipment (TOE) and Tables of 
Distribution Allowance (TDA). This only allowed management of the force by slated 
personnel instead of contracting skill level. There was a disconnect between force structure 
numbers and the contracting skill level of the personnel filling those slots. Reed stated 
(2010) due to this disparity, acquisition leaders made force structure decisions on a macro-
level as opposed to subordinate organizational level needs. He concluded that the 
contracting community must consider both the workload and competency level of soldiers 
in its methods for determining unit size and composition (Reed 2010). Reed suggested to 
evaluate the actual skill level of an individual contracting soldier and place him or her in 
the appropriate slot. 
C. COMPETENCY AND PROFICIENCY ISSUES  
Contract Management is not just a problem in the Army; it is a problem that exists 
across the DoD. Dr. Rene Rendon and U.S. Navy LCDR Timothy Winn highlighted issues 
with DoD contract management processes (2017). The authors emphasized that contracting 
professionals need to have the requisite skills to meet the modern challenges that will 
impact the current acquisition workforce. The authors reviewed and compared four 
competency models to include the DoD contracting competency framework, the National 
Contract Management Agency’s (NCMA) Contract Management Body of Knowledge 
(CMBOK) model, the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) Competency framework, and the 
National Institute for Government Purchasing (NIGP) Competency framework. The 
authors compared all four competency models and looked for differences between the 
models. The DoD, FAI, and NIGP models focused on the contracting process, tasks, and 
activities from the buyer’s perspective. There are minimal hierarchical relationships that 
align each competency with the process, job task, and sub-tasks contracting personnel 
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would perform. Federal and DoD uses the DoD and FAI competency model, while state 
and local government uses the NIGP. The NCMA CMBOK has an extensive hierarchical 
relationship between primary competencies, job tasks, and job sub-tasks. Unlike the DoD, 
FAI, and NIGP, the NCMA CMBOK includes concise and detailed contracting 
competencies both from the buyer and seller perspective. The NCMA CMBOK model is 
one that commercial industries used to determine the efficiency of its workforce. The 
authors suggested the DoD make improvements to the contracting competency model by 
addressing deficiencies through employing aspects from the CMBOK competency model 
(Rendon and Winn 2017). The CMBOK model provides detail for each contracting task as 
opposed to the DoD competency model that provides a nominal relationship between tasks. 
Much like the DoD Contracting Competency model, the 51C Proficiency Process model 
views contracting only from the government’s or buyer’s perspective. There are benefits 
for Army contracting personnel to understand contracting from both the government’s 
perspective as the buyer and the private sector as the seller. 
As Rendon and Winn (2017) affirmed, the new contracting competency model may 
increase proficiency among the contracting workforce but may require new training models 
to align to competency models. In follow-on work, Rendon addressed concerns about 
contracting professional education and competency. This work highlighted training 
concerns across the DoD and identified a significant disparity in the structure, scope, and 
supporting documentation associated with each respective service’s training framework 
(Rendon 2019). He found a disparity in the emphasis that each service framework places 
on different phases of the contract life cycle. Rendon’s research inquired if the training 
provided by the DoD services truly reflected what the DoD contracting workforce needed 
(Rendon 2019). The author recommended contracting organizations develop new 
hierarchical structure competency models that align job tasks with competency processes, 
emphasizing granularity for each contract competency, expanding contracting 
competencies to include industrial processes, and emphasizing continuous learning 
(Rendon 2019). This capstone study attempted to identify competency and contracting 
training issues across the Army contracting workforce. Our study used Rendon’s research 
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to formulate a traceability matrix to identify training requirements in each contracting 
environment.  
To get the right set of skills, the government could acquire subject matter skill sets 
necessary to train and improve the proficiency among the contracting workforce (Scott and 
Thompson 2019). Congress established the Congressional Section 809 panel in 2016 to 
review acquisition procedures and regulations in the DoD to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the acquisition corps (Scott and Thompson 2019). The panel proposed 
improvements to amend the hiring process for critical skill gaps, adequately fund and 
manage workforce development, and create a permanent personnel system just for the 
acquisition workforce. Daryl Scott and Dina Thompson (2019) reviewed recommendations 
from a Congressional Section 809 panel concerning professional development and 
acquisition workforce readiness. They recommended improved training competency 
models, “using specific, mission-related tasks” that require a supervisor to provide 
feedback, which would help identify training gaps (Scott and Thompson 2019, 24). Our 
capstone study attempted to identify training differences using the actual tasks performed 
by environment to identify the training requirements suited for an environment’s mission.  
Even if training were perfect, it does not appear that there is a way to measure the 
effectiveness of that training in terms of contracting outcomes. In 2017, the GAO examined 
the extent to which Army leaders evaluated the contracting workforce efficiency and 
effectiveness of contracting operations. The GAO indicated that leaders conducted 
contracting reviews but did not establish methods to evaluate the effectiveness of 
contracting operations. Contracting organizations must adhere and be able to measure cost, 
schedule, and performance in order to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of 
contracting operations. The GAO concluded that contracting leaders focused more on 
contracting mandates to include funds obligations before fund expirations, competition 
rates, and small business participation goals, but failed to create meaningful metrics (Mak 
2017). As a result, Army leaders did not have the quantitative data to determine if they had 
enough qualified contracting workforce to operate efficiently and effectively. The GAO 
recommended leaders develop systematic timelines of contract award, cost savings 
attributed to contracting activities, and quantity of contractor products and services (Mak 
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2017). The GAO also suggested for the Army to create a training program that would 
address untrained skills in the workforce. By collecting meaningful historical data from the 
workforce, Army leaders could develop training programs that address untrained skills in 
the workforce. This capstone study used the data from BAD to determine the tasks required 
for each contracting environment to inform Army contracting training programs. 
Unfortunately, training shortfalls in the contracting workforce are not new. The 
DoD published a strategic plan in 2016 and a workforce plan in 2017 to address acquisition 
workforce competency, but neither established clear workforce training requirements and 
proficiency objectives (DiNapoli 2019). The DoD has yet to conduct competency 
assessments to determine where the department needs to modernize its workforce. Our 
capstone study will help inform the understanding of the proficiency gaps in the workforce 
to help identify training requirements.  
Rendon, Uday Apte, and Aruna Apte, also addressed training gaps in DoD services 
contracting. They analyzed DoD-wide trends, challenges, Army-unique issues regarding 
training gaps, and how these gaps contributed to poor services contract management. They 
conducted an empirical study using data collected in surveys from the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force to analyze how the services are managing acquisition. The surveys focused on 
contract characteristics, acquisition management methods, project-management approach, 
service acquisition leadership, and other management issues. Based on the results from the 
survey, respondents did not believe Defensive Acquisition University (DAU) training 
alone was adequate to train the contracting workforce. The authors recommended that the 
DoD increase the availability of training as well as provide more appropriate training “in 
the form of experiential or on-the-job training, and localized coaching and mentoring in 
contracting procedures, as opposed to additional formal Defense Acquisition University 
classroom training” (Rendon, U. Apte, and A. Apte 2012, 24). The authors concluded that 
traditional training might familiarize the trainee with contracting tasks, but the DoD 
workforce cannot achieve proficiency through online and classroom training alone. Our 
capstone study will conduct the initial analysis to evaluate the training requirements for 
contracting soldiers in each contracting environment.  
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D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOME-STATION AND DEPLOYED 
CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENTS 
In 1993, Kelly Campbell, an NPS graduate, conducted an academic review on 
contingency contracting issues in the Army. Campbell used “contingency” to refer to 
deployed contracting environments. He identified the differences in the duties of 
contracting officers in home-station to duties of contracting officers in the contingency 
environment. Campbell identified instances where contracting officers lacked the 
prerequisite skills and training needed to support deployed Army units effectively. The 
author recalls a poignant example of operations in Grenada during fiscal year 1983 where 
contracting officers deployed “were ineffective, through no fault of their own” (Campbell 
1993, 16). Contracting officers attended formal training; however, the officers did not have 
any on-the-job contracting experience. Campbell’s observations highlighted the gap in 
skills needed in different contracting environments as well as lack of experience in 
contracting duties. Our capstone study utilized Campbell’s work to formulate our thesis 
that home-station training does not prepare contracting officers for deployed contracting 
tasks.  
While Campbell (1993) asserted the skills and experience needed in home-station 
are significantly different than those skills needed in deployment and may not prepare a 
contracting soldier for the demands required in deployment because the skills and tasks are 
fundamentally different. In a 1993 NPS thesis, United States Air Force (USAF) Captains 
Jon Tigges and Thomas Snyder detailed the challenges experienced by Air Force and Army 
contracting officers involved in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) during fiscal year 1991. 
The theme of the thesis was that contracting officers were not fully prepared for ODS 
deployments. They surveyed contracting officers in organizations responsible for 
conducting training and interviewed heads of contingency contracting planning. They 
concluded that formal training courses did not adequately prepare contingency contracting 
officers to support requirements for deployment to ODS. This was due to the lack of 
instruction on contingency contracting, lack of on-the-job training, and lack of realism of 
deployment exercises. The survey questions focused on contracting officer’s opinions 
about training improvements. The survey also revealed that the tasks performed in 
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deployment were different than those performed at home-station. The authors 
recommended adopting a formal contracting officer training course that would address 
training requirements for each environment (Tigges and Snyder 1993). This capstone study 
utilized the 51C Job Aid to evaluate training tasks against the tasks contracting personnel 
performed in each environment. The work of Tigges and Snyder help shape our 
methodology in that we evaluated the differences between the tasks performed in each 
environment against the work accomplished in home-station.  
In 2000, United States Marine Corps (USMC) Captain Chester McMillon 
conducted a comparative analysis in contingency contracting within the DoD. He contends 
an organization must recognize that home-station assignments will not prepare contracting 
officers for oversea contracting. McMillon compared the contingency contracting 
regulations, organizational structure, contingency support plans, and training requirements 
and duties between the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine contracting officers. McMillion 
used the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation (AFARS) to analyze the Army contingency 
contracting workforce. He observed that the Army had not established a contingency 
contracting training program, which prevented contracting personnel from gaining 
valuable information and experience prior to deployment. McMillon identified tasks that a 
contracting officer completed in a contingency environment were significantly different 
from the tasks completed at home-station. McMillion found that home-station assignments 
are not perfectly suited to prepare contracting soldiers for overseas assignments (McMillon 
2000). While McMillon based his analysis on the AFARS, this capstone study based its  
analysis on the Job Aid.  
In a 2007 Department of the Army (DA) report, the Secretary of the Army 
established an independent commission to identify lessons learned in expeditionary 
operations and provide recommendations for future expeditionary missions. The Secretary 
of the Army’s goal was to achieve a force with greater effectiveness and efficiency (DA 
2007). The commission stated that the institutional Army does not provide the skills 
necessary for acquisition personnel to respond and sustain contracting requirements in an 
expeditionary operation. The commission found that the Army acquisition workforce 
lacked the training, personnel, and structure to meet the needs in a deployed environment, 
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only 53% of civilians and 56% of military personnel met certification requirements for 
their current positions (DA 2007). The commission stated the Army needed an increase in 
the training and experience of 51Cs to be effective in expeditionary environments. To 
balance the increase in demands, the commission recommended an increase in General 
Officer positions for Acquisition Professionals, to treat contracting skills as a “core 
competence,” and develop a solution to remediate disparity between civilian and military 
task capabilities in an expeditionary environment. (DA 2007). The commission stated that 
there are not enough 51C contracting General Officers to make operational decisions to 
advocate for ACC to influence contracting in expeditionary locations. Also, asserted that 
the Army does not incentivize civilian personnel well enough to fill expeditionary roles. 
The commission stated organizations should provide incentives to the civilian workforce 
appropriately (DA 2007). Simultaneously, the Army community was not able to fill 
inherently governmental roles fast enough because of a shortage within the workforce. This 
report stated expeditionary contracting should never be the first assignment for a new 51C 
contracting soldier and doing so is “the equivalent of teaching someone how to swim by 
throwing them in the water” (DA 2007, 5). The commission found five areas the Army 
Acquisition workforce needed improvement. A 51C contracting soldier could expect a 
seven-fold increase of deployed workload compared to workload in home-station. The 
commission concluded that the Institutional Army should recognize contracting as a key 
capability. There are almost as many contractors in deployed environments as there are 
military personnel; therefore, Army leadership should recognize the impact contracting has 
on operations in theater. The overall Army acquisition force needs adequate training, 
manning, and empowerment. Finally, contracting should be a core competency (DA 2007). 
The DA report provided this capstone study the evidence to support our hypothesis that 
home-station training alone does not prepare a contracting soldier for tasks required in a 
deployed environment. 
Roxanne Barbaris and Christine Callanan (2008) detailed some challenges in 
contingency contracting. They provided a snapshot in time for the existing conditions 
during the formation of the ACC in 2008. The authors highlighted a skills gap based on 
“an influx of new contracting personnel” (Barbaris and Callanan 2008, 25). They 
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investigated how the Army improved its contingency contracting process to meet the 
demands of its wartime mission and acknowledged the Army’s inability to meet increased 
customer demands and workloads in a contingency environment. Barbaris and Callanan 
found evidence that there are insufficient numbers of contracting professionals, and those 
that are in the workforce have to face more complex requirements. They stated that the 
increased complexity of work resulted in increased error rates. The operational tempo in a 
contingency environment differed from operations in home-station. They also concluded 
that contracting personnel operating in a contingency environment must be able to 
formulate solutions quickly to meet the demands of an Army at war.  
In a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Major Sara Kimsey, documented the strain 
on the ACC to provide trained professionals according to the Joint Publication 4-10 
Operational Contract Support (OCS) (2015). She cited that “a significantly resource-
constrained environment puts more pressure on ACC/ECC to determine how best to enable 
contracting support across multiple organizations” (Kimsey 2015, 62). Kimsey stated that 
each DoD service department needed to create comprehensive procedures for contingency 
contracting. The services relied too heavily on contracting officers’ basic awareness of 
OCS procedures. Understanding OCS procedures will help the organization define Army 
doctrine and structures. The Army needs to understand the current OCS issues to develop 
appropriate training models (Kimsey 2015, 94). Kimsey suggested a balanced development 
of OCS planning, proper resourcing, and integration of contracting across various Army 
disciplines (2015). Kimsey’s thesis provides qualitative research that the operating 
procedures in each environment are different as well as training requirements for 
deployment are different than home-station.  
Taken together, this literature review has shown that ACC may need to address 
several aspects of the acquisition workforce, regulation, and training programs to prepare 
contracting personnel. Rendon (2019) noted that formalized classroom training is not 
adequate to prepare contracting personnel for contracting in deployment environments. 
The Army acquisition workforce is undertrained and not meeting the certifications outlined 
in DAWIA (Reed 2010; Abbruzzese 2012). The Army does not have an effective incentive 
program to encourage personnel with the expertise and experience to take on leadership 
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positions (Robinson 2012). There are possible flaws in the Army’s competency model and 
the ACC could benefit by establishing metrics to measure and assess the contracting 
workforce (Rendon and Winn 2017; Rendon 2017; Scott and Thompson; Mak 2017; 
DiNapoli 2019; Rendon et al. 2012). Finally, the Army should consider developing an 
effective training program to prepare contracting personnel for contracting in a deployment 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology section describes the process the capstone study took to address 
the three research questions. The capstone study evaluated ACC Business Analysis 
Division (BAD) quantitative data against the Job Aid training tasks. The study determined 
the best method to analyze the data to answer the issues addressed in the problem statement 
and research questions. The BAD data included contracting actions in all three 
environments covering the from 2008–2018. The data contains 298,344 home-station 
records, 5,578 short-duration deployment records, and 42,441 long-duration deployment 
records. The following section will address the detailed process. 
A. DATA OVERVIEW 
This capstone study utilized data from 546,364 Contract Action Report (CAR) with 
obligations totaling $22.4 billion. The CAR is a mandatory report to congress from the 
contracting officer due after any contractual obligation. The data spans from fiscal years 
2008 to 2018: the start of ACC up to the most recent complete fiscal year. 
B. ENVIRONMENT DEFINITIONS 
The capstone study based the environment definitions on deployment duration and 
flow of forces to and from each respective environment, as shown in Table 1. The capstone 
study used Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAAC) to identify and 
group organizations into one environment location: home-station, short-duration 
deployment, and long-duration deployment listed in Appendix B. The capstone study 
defined the home-station environment as locations that soldiers deploy from such as the 
Army bases in the U.S., Germany, and Italy. The capstone study defined short-duration 
deployment and long-duration deployment environments as DODAAC locations soldiers 
deploy to from home-station. The capstone study defined a short-duration deployment 
environment as a deployment duration of less than nine months. An example of a short-
duration deployment would include Environment Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) 
operations or Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR). Short-duration 
deployment DODAACs were from short-duration exercises in the INDOPACOM, 
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SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and EUCOM regions. The long-duration deploymment time 
was greater than nine months and is also a location staffed on a rotational basis 365 days a 
year. The long-duration deployment environment includes locations such as Camp 
Buehring, Kuwait and Regional Contracting Center (RCC) Afghanistan.  
The capstone study developed the definitions in Table 1 based on a cumulative 
seven years of contracting experience as well as background research.  




The capstone group primarily utilized two tools that would enable a functional 
decomposition and statistical analysis of the contracting data: R and the traceability matrix  
in Figures 2 and 3. The study presumed that all deploying contracting personnel would 
need to be proficient with the Job Aid tasks to maximize their mission effectiveness. Also, 
all contingencies and operations have unique support requirements. The contracting 
battalion commander must ensure the training of its subordinate organizations and ensure 
these units are ready to execute contracting tasks upon arrival in the deployed environment. 
To conduct realistic, effective training, commanders must understand the historical data to 
better plan and prepare for future contingency operations.  
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Figure 2. Traceability Matrix between Job Aid Tasks and BAD quantitative data (R 
Short Numbers 301 and 316). Adapted from ACC (2019) 
 
Figure 3. Traceability Matrix between Job Aid Tasks and BAD Quantitative Data 
(R Short Numbers 401 to 413). Adapted from ACC (2019). 
The traceability matrix is the foundation of all data analysis for this capstone. The 
matrix allows us to determine which individual task contracting personnel performed for 
each contract action. The columns on the matrix identify all contract actions grouped 
categorically by contract type. These contract types consisted of four major categories, 
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which include Basic Ordering Vehicle, Contract/Purchase Order, Task Order/Delivery 
Order, and Modifications. The rows for the matrix list the 300- to 400-level tasks from the 
Job Aid.  
Using the Job Aid as a guide, the capstone study linked contracting actions to tasks 
contracting personnel performed. There were six Job Aid tasks that the capstone study 
could not map to a specific contract action because the distributing agency did not record 
the tasks clearly in the CAR record. The capstone study highlighted these six tasks in 
yellow on the matrix. The capstone study’s detailed assumptions and justifications for the 
traceability matrix is in Appendix C.  
D. SYSTEM ENGINEERING TOOLS AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES  
The capstone study accomplished the analysis by using the R software. R is a 
language and environment for statistical computing and graphics (R Foundation n.d.). The 
capstone study sorted the data by environment, associated task and transaction type, and 
manipulated R to providedetailed charts and outputs to answer the research questions.  
The capstone study used the Pearson’s chi-squared test to determine if the 
environments were different. The test allowed us to test the hypothesis that all actions 
contracting professionals performed and conducted across the environments were equal 
repetition. The capstone study performed the chi-squared test on all three environments 
then performed the chi-squared test on all three possible combinations of environments: 
home-station versus long-duration deployment, home-station versus short-duration 
deployment, and long-duration deployment versus short-duration deployment. The 
capstone study used the likelihood that a contracting professional performed the task in 
each environment to compare the differences between environments. We calculated the 
likelihood by counting the times a task occurred in each environment and dividing those 
counts by the total number of actions performed in that environment. This represented the 
chance a soldier would perform the given task in the given environment. Then, we 
subtracted the short-duration deployment and long-duration deployment odds from the 
home-station odds to calculate the differences. If the results were positive, those tasks were 
more likely to occur in the home-station environments. If the results were negative, those 
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tasks were more likely to occur in the contingency environments. Negative differences 
represent potentially under-trained tasks: tasks that a soldier is more likely to perform in a 
contingency environment than in home-station. In other words, a task in which soldiers 
have less experience or exposure.  
The capstone study explored the intra-environment variation using box plots. Each 
DODAAC in the environment produced an odds ratio for tasks that represented a sample 
of the population of possible odds ratios for that specific task for that environment. The R 
software produced box plots representing the distribution of the odds ratios for the tasks. 
The shape of the box plots represented the variability of the task performance odds. The 
larger boxes had more variation, while smaller had less variation.  
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The capstone study was able to answer the research questions successfully. In the 
problem statement, the team wished to detect potential training gaps that result from 
different task performance in the home-station environment compared to deployed 
environments. This study was not able to measure training gaps directly but was able to 
use the task occurrence frequency. A contracting officer frequently performing a task in an 
environment leads to increased task proficiency. Any tasks that were less likely to occur in 
the home-station environment compared to the deployed environments represented 
potential training gaps.  
A. ARE THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS (HOME-STATION, SHORT-
DURATION, LONG-DURATION) DIFFERENT? 
The capstone study found that the tasks performed in the different environments 
are not the same. We performed a chi-square test of independence to determine if there was 
a difference in the frequency of tasks between environments. The relation between these 
variables was significant, χ2 (42, N = 546,363) = 45,654, p < .0001. The team also 
performed the chi-square test of independence for each of the combinations of two 
environments. The relation between the variables was significant for each pair. For home-
station compared with short-duration, χ2 (21, N = 546,363) = 3,025.8, p < .0001, for home-
station and long-duration, χ2 (21, N = 546,363) = 42,813, p < .0001, and for short-duration 
and long-duration, χ2 (21, N = 546,363) = 4009.6, p < .0001. 
B. IF THE TASKS PERFORMED ARE DIFFERENT IN EACH 
ENVIRONMENT, THEN WHAT WERE THE TASK FREQUENCY 
DIFFERENCES?  
Table 2 summarizes the likelihood for each task by the environment in descending 
order from most frequently to least frequently performed. The total contracting actions for 
each environment were 298,344 for home-station, 5,578 for short-duration, and 242,441 
for long-duration. To calculate the likelihood, we divided the count of performed tasks by 
those contracting environment totals and converting the results to a percentage.  
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The capstone study sorted Table 2 by the left-most green column, which ranks the 
tasks from one to 22. The next six columns contain the data for each of the three contracting 
environments in pairs with the task name and then the likelihood of that task. The likelihood 
represents the chance a contracting worker would perform that individual task for any given 
contracting action based on the historical occurrence of that task’s performance in the given 
environment. The home-station environment data is in the black and grey columns, the 
short-duration environment data in the blue columns, and the long-duration environment 
data in the orange columns. The order of tasks is different for each environment because 
no two share the same rank order for task likelihood.  
Table 2. Task Likelihood Ranked in Descending Order by Environment 
Rank Home-Station Likelihood (%) Short-Duration 
Likelihood 
(%) Long Duration 
Likelihood 
(%) 
1  4.6 Advise WRT Acq Matters  84  
4.6 Advise WRT 





2  3.1 Review Req Packet  75.6  
4.4 ID Supported 
Unit  86.1  
4.4 ID 
Supported Unit  94.2  
3  4.4 ID Supported Unit  74.9  
3.1 Review Req 
Packet  80.5  
3.1 Review 
Req Packet  69.1  
4  3.8 Post Award Orientation  59.8  
3.8 Post Award 
Orientation  67.1  
3.8 Post Award 
Orientation  63.9  
5  3.15 K Closeout  54.3  3.15 K Closeout  61.1  3.15 K Closeout  59.9  
6  3.14 Modify K  52.3  3.4 Solicit Competition  58.9  
3.4 Solicit 
Competition  58.3  
7  3.4 Solicit Competition  47.7  
3.13 Process 
Payment  58.9  
3.13 Process 
Payment  58.3  
8  3.13 Process Payment  47.7  
3.5 Evaluate 
Offers  58.1  
3.7 Prepare K 
Award  57.1  
9  3.7 Prepare K Award  46.6  
3.7 Prepare K 
Award  52  3.14 Modify K  41.7  
10  4.5 Train OCS Activities  39.7  
3.12 Monitor K 
Performance  51.3  
3.5 Evaluate 
Offers  36.6  
11  3.12 Monitor K Performance  36.7  
4.5 Train OCS 





12  3.5 Evaluate Offers  33.9  
3.2 Conduct 
Market Research  43.8  
3.3 Conduct 
Acq Planning  29.7  
13  3.10 Issue TO/DO  27  3.3 Conduct Acq Planning  42.9  
3.10 Issue TO/
DO  28.5  
14  3.9 Train/Manage COR  25.6  3.14 Modify K  41.1  
4.5 Train OCS 
Activities  27.1  
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Rank Home-Station Likelihood (%) Short-Duration 
Likelihood 
(%) Long Duration 
Likelihood 
(%) 
15  3.2 Conduct Market Research  25.3  
3.9 Train/Manage 
COR  40  
3.12 Monitor 
K Performance  26  














18  4.9 Utilize SF44  12.4  3.10 Issue TO/DO  16  
4.9 Utilize 
SF44  20.4  
19  4.1 Process Claims  5.67  
4.1 Process 
Claims  10.1  
4.1 Process 
Claims  5.18  
20  3.11 Exercise Option  4.59  
4.12 Educate 
Vendors  1.51  
3.11 Exercise 
Option  1.87  
21  4.12 Educate Vendors  1.18  4.2 Terminate K  1.31  
4.12 Educate 
Vendors  0.579  
22  4.2 Terminate K  1.02  3.11 Exercise Option  0.95  
4.2 Terminate 
K  0.483  
 
C. INTRA-ENVIRONMENT DIFFERENCES 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the home station, short-duration deployment, and long 
duration deployment boxplots for each of the 22 tasks. The box plot shows the range of 
likelihood for each environment sampling by DODAACs. The box represents the middle 
50 percent of the data from the 25th to the 75th percentiles. The horizontal line in each box 
is the median for that task. Tasks with the least amount of skew have horizontal lines closest 
to the center of the box. The chart illustrates outliers with red circles. A shorter box plot 
with a centered horizontal line indicates there is less variation in the likelihood across 
DODAACs. The differences in the sizes of the plots represent on which tasks differ the 
most across the different contracting offices represented by the DODACs. We produced 
plots for all three environments to explore the intra-environment variability. For example, 
in the home-station plot, Figure 4, tasks 3.1 and 3.14 have very similar likelihoods across 
the home-station offices, whereas task 4.5 has more variation in the likelihood observed in 
the home-station DODAACs.  
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Figure 4. Likelihood to Perform Tasks in Home-station Environment 
 
 
Figure 5. Odds to Perform Tasks in Short-Duration Environment 
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Figure 5 shows the short-duration boxplots for each of the 22 tasks. The box plot 
shows the range of likelihoods for the short-duration environment using its DODAACs as 
samples. This environment had the least likelihood variation and also the fewest 
DODAACs.  
 
Figure 6. Likelihood to Perform Tasks in Long-Duration Environment 
Figure 6 shows the long-duration boxplots for each of the 22 tasks. The box plot 
shows the range of odds for the long-duration environment. This environment had the most 
likelihood variation and the second largest set of DODAACs. The team did not thoroughly 
examine the reason for a large amount of variation. A possible explanation is the long-
duration environment data had the largest amount of geographic diversity covering Korea, 
Kuwait, and Afghanistan.  
Figure 7 illustrates the differences between home-station and short-duration 
environment likelihoods to perform a contracting task. We subtracted the home-station 
likelihood from the short-duration likelihoods. Negative numbers indicate tasks that are 
potentially undertrained because soldiers are less likely to perform that task as frequently 
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in home-station as compared to a short-duration deployment. Positive numbers indicate 
tasks that soldiers are more likely to be proficient because they are more likely to perform 
the task at home-station than on the short-duration. These results show that a soldier would 
execute task 3.5 Evaluate Offers about 25% more of the time while deployed. The results 
also show that a soldier would perform task 3.14 Modify a Contract about 10% more often 
while at home-station. There are two plausible explanations for this result. First, because 
competition is the quickest way to make contract awards, it follows that evaluating offers 
would happen more often in a short-duration environment since there is less time available 
to explore noncompetitive acquisition strategies compared to home-station. Second, 
modifications were less likely during short-duration because those contracts did not last 
long enough to require as many modifications as multiyear home-station contracts.  
 
Negative number indicates a potentially undertrained task. 
Figure 7. Difference between Short-Duration and Home-Station Environments  
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Figure 8 illustrates the differences between home-station and long-duration 
environment likelihoods to perform a contracting task. The negative and positive numbers 
represent the same training differences as the short-duration graph. These results show that 
soldiers executed task 4.4 Identify Supported Unit about 20% more of the time while 
deployed and that they performed task 4.5 Train Operational Contracting Support (OCS) 
Activities more than 12% more often while at home-station. The task 4.4 Identify 
Supported Unit likelihood difference made intuitive sense to the team given the rotational 
nature of contracting and supported units during long-duration deployments compared to 
the more fixed home-station support relationships. The task 4.5 Train OCS Activities 
likelihood difference also made sense given that contracting soldiers train supported units 
before deployments to prepare those units to execute OCS activities in theater.  
 
Figure 8. Difference between Home-Station and Long-Duration Environments 
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D. HOW CRITICAL ARE THE DIFFERENCES? 
The capstone team examined criticality in five different ways. Each examination 
used dollars as a proxy for criticality. The more dollars obligated when a task occurred 
made that task more expensive and, therefore more critical. The team labeled the resulting 
units task obligations and then ranked all 22 tasks in descending order based on the task’s 
percentage of task obligations. The relative task obligations examination was a global 
method because it used the data from all three environments at the same time. Figure 9 
displays the results with the most critical tasks highest on the figure.  
 
Figure 9. Relative % of Obligations for Short-Duration and Long-Duration 
Environment 
For the second examination, the team calculated a spend percentage for each task. 
The capstone study calculated the spend percentage by dividing the sum of obligated 
dollars when the given task occurred by the total number of obligated dollars in the 
contracting environment. The spend percentage represented the number of dollars spent 
when the given task occurred as a part of the total dollars spent in the environment. The 
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spend percentages were not universal. The capstone study used each obligation from one 
contracting environment were once. Figure 10 displays the results of the spend percentage 
for the short-duration deployment environment, and Figure 11 displays the results for the 
long-duration deployment environments.  
 
Figure 10. Spend % of Short-Duration Deployment Environment 
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Figure 11. Spend % of Long-Duration Deployment Environment 
 
The third examination the capstone conducted for criticality was a spend percentage 
gap analysis. This examination compared the difference in spend percentages in home-
station with the short and long-duration deployed environments; Figures 12 and 13 display 
the results of the examination. The negative numbers represented the largest gaps between 
home-station and deployed spend percentages. 
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Figure 12. Spend % Gap between Home-Station and Short-Durations 
 
 
Figure 13. Spend % Gap between Home-Station and Short-Durations 
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The team’s fourth examination of criticality was to summarize the five different 
criticality rankings: relative task obligations, short-duration spend percentage, long-
duration spend percentage, short-duration spend percentage gap, and long-duration spend 
gap. Table 3 contains the summary results in descending order of importance. The team 
used the mode of the five rankings to order the summary table. The team selected the modal 
ranking over the mean rankings because some tasks ended up with the same mean ranking. 
Table 3 shows that the most critical tasks are tasks 4.6, Advise with Respect to Acquisition 
Matters, and 4.4, Identify Supported Unit, which is plausible because the majority of 
contracting actions will involve contracting soldiers working with their supported units. 
The least critical tasks in the list are 4.12, Educate Vendors, and 4.2, Terminate Contract, 
which reveal some potential shortcomings of using dollars as the proxy for criticality. 
Contract termination was not very expensive based on the capstone team’s measures, which 
does not match the team member’s experience where every contract termination was very 
critical. The capstone team decided that the criticality question required additional research 
to answer completely, but the capstone report would continue with the dollars as a proxy 
because of the time available for the project. 
Table 3. Summary of Criticality Rankings 











4.6 Advise WRT 
Acq Matters 1 1 1 1 11 2 
4.4 ID Supported 
Unit 2 2 3 2 10 1 
3.1 Review Req 
Packet 3 3 2 3 16 22 
3.8 Post Award 
Orientation 4 4 4 4 9 7 
3.15 K Closeout 5 5 5 5 8 6 
3.4 Solicit 
Competition 6 6 6 6 6 4 
3.7 Prepare K 
Award 7 7 7 7 5 3 
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Payment 8 8 8 8 7 5 
3.10 Issue TO/DO 9 9 17 9 21 8 
3.14 Modify K 10 10 18 10 22 20 
4.5 Train OCS 
Activities 11 11 11 11 15 21 
3.12 Monitor K 
Performance 12 12 13 12 14 19 
3.9 Train/Manage 
COR 13 13 14 13 12 18 
3.2 Conduct Market 
Research 14 14 10 14 3 12 
3.5 Evaluate Offers 15 15 9 15 2 13 
3.3 Conduct Acq 
Planning 16 16 12 16 1 9 
4.9 Utilize SF44 17 17 15 17 4 10 
3.6 Notify 
Unsuccessful Offers 18 18 16 18 13 11 
3.11 Exercise 
Option 19 19 20 19 20 17 
4.1 Process Claims 20 20 19 20 19 16 
4.12 Educate 
Vendors 21 21 21 21 18 15 
4.2 Terminate K 22 22 22 22 17 14 
 
The capstone team’s fifth and final criticality examination was to check for low 
likelihood high expense tasks. These tasks would relate to or spend more money than 
expected based on the frequency of their occurrence in the records. The capstone team 
created four scatter plots to complete the analysis. Two scatter plots compared the 




Figure 14. Scatter Plot of Short-Duration Task Obligations versus Tasks Odds 
 
Figure 15. Scatter Plot of Long-Duration Tasks Obligations versus Odds 
The next two scatter plots compared the likelihood of a given task to the spend 
percentage for that given task. Figures 16 and 17 display the results for the short and long-
duration deployment environments.  
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Figure 16. Scatter Plot of Short-Duration Spend % versus Likelihood 
 
Figure 17. Scatter Plot of Long-Duration Spend % versus Likelihood 
For each scatter plot, those tasks that plotted in Figure 17 the blue trend line 
warranted further investigation as they were more expensive than predicted by their 
likelihood. The capstone team was not able to draw strong conclusions from the scatter plot 
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examination because it was not clear about how far a task would need to be from the trend 
line to be of concern. For instance, task 4.9 in Figure 17 indicated that a lot of cheap actions 
are associated with a large amount of money spent. This issue will require additional 
research to determine the concern boundary. Absent further research, criticality and 
likelihood appear to be decently linearly related with most tasks close to the trend line. 
In conclusion, the team was able to answer all three research questions to different 
confidence levels. The team confidently concluded that the three contracting environments 
are not the same. The team measured the differences between the environments and 
compared them using likelihood percentages to answer how different each environment 
was. The capstone was less confident in answering the third research question because of 
the limitations of the dollars proxy for criticality. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The capstone study was able to reach a conclusion for each of the three research 
questions to varying confidence levels. From those conclusions, the study decided on three 
recommendations and five areas for follow on research.  
A. CONCLUSION   
The operating environments are different. The capstone study confidently 
concluded that the environment matters concerning frequency of contract tasks 
performed. We proved this with the chi-square test of independence as noted in Chapter III 
of this study. The study was able to confidently reject the null hypothesis that the 
environments were the same, allowing the study to accept the alternate hypothesis that the 
environments are different with respect to the frequency of contracting tasks performed.    
The study considered what makes the environments different. The type of 
contracting action performed dictates which tasks contracting personnel performed. Each 
environment had a different contract action distribution. Contract modifications and task 
orders occurred more frequently in the home station environment, while new contracts and 
purchase orders were more likely in the deployed environments. Multiyear contracts, those 
requiring the task “exercise and option” were more likely to occur in the home station 
environment as well.  
The insight from this conclusion challenges the assumption in the Job Aid that one 
year in a home station environment is sufficient to prepare a soldier for deployment without 
a considerable training effort. The work in home-station is not the same as the work in the 
short duration deployment or long-duration deployment environments. Historical data 
indicated that short duration and long duration deployments should have a different training 
plan. Units preparing for deployment would need to incorporate additional training 
to supplement home station training.    
The capstone study found that tasks performed in each environment is different. 
The tasks occurred at different frequencies in the three environments.  The largest 
difference in task likelihoods between home station compared to the short duration 
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deployment environment was 25%. The largest difference between task likelihoods in the 
home station compared to the long duration deployment environment was 20%. The 
average differences for tasks soldiers were more likely to perform in the short duration 
deployment environment compared to the home station was 10%, and the average 
differences for the long duration deployment environment was 7.5%.  
The insight from this conclusion is the majority of contracting tasks occurred more 
frequently in the short duration deployment and long duration deployment environments 
compared to the home station. The likelihoods alone are not enough to prove a training 
deficiency, but they offer areas warranting exploration. ACC will need to conduct future 
research to define significance based on the size of the gap. The capstone study was only 
able to measure the size of the gap but could not, for example, determine if a 20% gap 
mattered more than a 5% gap. The gaps are likely conservative because soldiers perform a 
larger percentage of contracting work in deployed environments.      
The capstone study found that the difference between task occurrence between the 
environment does matter in each environment. We allocated each obligated dollar against 
each task performed to create a relative obligation percentage. The study assumed that 
those tasks that have the highest relative obligation percentage to be the most critical tasks 
as noted in Table 3. The tasks with the highest obligation percentages were 4.6 Advise with 
Respect to Acquisition Matters and 4.4 Identify Support Unit. The study used the relative 
obligation percentage to price the tasks and then displayed the results three ways: as a bar 
chart, as a composite table, and as scatter plots.  
The insight from this finding is that relative obligation percentage is not a good 
proxy for criticality. The principal failure for relative obligation percentage as a metric is 
that not all of the tasks actually obligate dollars. By treating all tasks as though they 
obligated money lead to results that do not stand up to academic scrutiny. For example, 
task 3.13 Process a Payment measured a relative obligation percentage of 7.2% meaning 
that the study determined that the task responsible for that percentage of the money 
obligated. This result is illogical because contracting officers do not obligated funds while 
processing a payment. Logically, all priced contract actions much more than 7% will 
involve processing a payment. In hindsight, the study realized that the relative obligation 
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percentage did not make sense because allocating obligations to tasks that do not obligate 
funds lead to nonsensical results. The tasks with the largest frequency gaps are tasks that 
require more training; thus, these are critical tasks.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS   
The capstone study has two audiences for recommendations which includes 
contracting commanders and future researchers. The study has one recommendation for 
commanders. The recommendations to commanders are changes to the current training 
model that can help better prepare soldiers for deployments. The study has three 
recommendations for future studies. We list future work in the following sections.  
(1) Recommendations to contracting commanders   
The capstone study recommends that commanders produce deliberate training 
plans to address the differences between environments. In the absence of additional data, 
the study recommends using the differences in task likelihood from this report as a basis. 
The Job Aid training strategy calls for one year in home-station to gain experience and 
proficiency under the mentorship of a senior warranted 1102 prior to a soldier’s first 
deployment (ACC 2019). The results of this study can better inform which areas a soldier 
should focus on based on which environment they expect to deploy. This additional 
information can help to maximize the first year in home-station while reinforcing those 
tasks that are uncommon in home-station but frequent in short-duration deployment or 
long-duration deployment environments.  
(2) Areas for future study   
Based on the 22 tasks from the Job Aid, what do commanders perceive to be tasks 
that require the most training emphasis per environment? The capstone study recommends 
validating the Traceability Matrix in Figure 2 with contracting commanders. Acquiring the 
perception from contracting commanders, would validate and further inform the 
requirements needed in different contracting environments. A future capstone study should 
explore the difference in contracting environments with the input from PCC commanders 
as well as the difficulty to perform the tasks.  
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How many times would a contracting officer need to repeat a task in order to be 
proficient? The Army found that the acquisition workforce lacked the training, personnel, 
and structure to meet the needs in a deployed environment, only 53% of civilians and 56% 
of military personnel met certification requirements for their current positions (DA 2007). 
The DA stated the Army needed an increase in the training and experience of 51Cs to be 
effective in expeditionary environments (DA 2007). Future studies could explore the issues 
of training decay and what types of tasks features a soldier would need to complete to gain 
proficiency that would transfer to theater. 
How do you incentivize the civilian workforce to take on leadership roles? 
Abbruzzese concluded ACC needs qualified trainers to identify training gaps as well as 
train newly transitioned 51C contracting soldiers. The lack of qualified personnel has 
contributed to competency issues in ACC (Abbruzzese 2012). Of the 50% of respondents 
who were qualified to become contracting officers, one in every four civilian contracting 
specialists preferred to decline their warrant to become contracting officers (Robinson 
2012). Future capstone studies can conduct the analysis of alternatives to determine the 
best incentives to grow and retain contracting officer trainers.  
In summary, contracting organizations can use analyzed contracting data to assists 
with more effective training planning. Prior to this study, previous research was only able 
to utilize qualitative data through surveys and observations perceptions to support similar 
conclusions. This study can lead to a new trend in developing training models for Army 
contracting units considering all researched data was unique to the Army Contracting 
Command’s units. This study developed a tool that contracting leaders can use to determine 
the top critical tasks for their unit. The tool from this study is modular and tailorable, and 
one can update the training tool to reflect new training guidance. This study showed it is 
possible to use contracting data from ACC’s Business Analytics Department to analyze 
training differences, task criticality, and tasks likelihood by theater. From this, a leader can 
determine training gaps by DODAAC using historical data. Future training models can use 
actual contracting data to develop training plans. The results would provide contracting 
commanders a rank order of tasks that contracting officers need to complete to be effective 
in a specific contracting environment.  
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APPENDIX A. 51C JOB AID 
Table 4. 51C Job Aid. Adapted from ACC (2019). 
ACC-70-3-4883-01  Review a Requirements Package  
ACC-70-3-4883-02  Conduct Market Research  
ACC-70-3-4883-03  Conduct Acquisition Planning  
ACC-70-3-4883-04  Solicit Competition  
ACC-70-3-4883-05  Receive Solicitation Responses and Evaluate Offers  
ACC-70-3-4883-06  
Prepare Award Synopsis - Notify Unsuccessful 
Offerors  
ACC-70-3-4883-07  Prepare Contract Award  
ACC-70-3-4883-08  Conduct a Post Award Orientation  
ACC-70-3-4883-09  
Train and Manage Contracting Officer 
Representatives  
ACC-70-3-4883-10  
Issue Task Order/ Delivery Order or Blanket Purchase 
Agreement Calls  
ACC-70-3-4883-11  Exercise a Contract Option  
ACC-70-3-4883-12  Monitor Contract Performance  
ACC-70-3-4883-13  Process Documents for Payment  
ACC-70-3-4883-14  Modify a Contract  
ACC-70-3-4883-15  Perform a Contract Closeout  
ACC-70-3-4883-16  Process an Unauthorized Commitment  
ACC-70-4-4883-01  Process a Contract Claim  
ACC-70-4-4883-02  Terminate a Contract  
ACC-70-4-4883-03  Process a Contract Protest  
ACC-70-4-4883-04  Identify Supported Units  
ACC-70-4-4883-05  
Train Supported Units (Operational Contract Support 
Activities)  
ACC-70-4-4883-06  
Advise Supported Units Regarding Acquisition 
Matters  
ACC-70-4-4883-07  Review Contract Support Integration Plan  
ACC-70-4-4883-08  
Train, Appoint and Manage Field Ordering Officer 
(FOO)  
ACC-70-4-4883-09  
Utilize a Standard Form 44, Purchase Order-Invoice 
Voucher  
ACC-70-4-4883-10  
Develop and Manage a Procurement Instrument 
Identification Number (PIIN) Log  
ACC-70-4-4883-11  
Train, Appoint and Manage Contracting Officers 
Representative (COR)  
ACC-70-4-4883-12  Conduct Vendor Education  
ACC-70-4-4883-13  Prepare for Deployment  
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APPENDIX B. ARMY CONTRACTING UNIT DODAAC LIST 
Table 5. Army Contracting Unit DODAAC. Adapted from BAD (n.d.). 
Awarding 
Contracting Office ID Awarding Contracting Office Name Environment 
W912PG 409TH CSB: RCO BAMBERG Home-station 
W912PB 409TH CSB: RCO BAVARIA Home-station 
W912PA 409TH CSB: RCO BENELUX Home-station 
W912PE 409TH CSB: RCO SCHWETZINGEN Home-station 
W91WFU 409TH CSB: RCO STUTTGART Home-station 




W912PX 410TH CSB: RCO KEY WEST Home-station 
W91QEX 410TH CSB: RCO MIAMI Home-station 
W912D0 413TH CSB: RCO ALASKA Home-station 
W912CN 413TH CSB: RCO HAWAII Home-station 
W912CZ 413TH CSB: RCO RICHARDSON Home-station 
W912PF 414TH CSB: RCO ITALY Home-station 
W911S6 
MICC - DUGWAY PROVING 
GROUND Home-station 
W911SG MICC - FORT BLISS Home-station 
W911RZ MICC - FORT CARSON Home-station 
W91151 MICC - FORT HOOD Home-station 
W9115U MICC - FORT HOOD Home-station 
W9124B MICC - FORT IRWIN Home-station 
W9124E MICC - FORT POLK Home-station 
W911RX MICC - FORT RILEY Home-station 
W911S8 
MICC - JOINT BASE LEWIS-
MCCHORD Home-station 
W9124Q 
MICC - WHITE SANDS MISSILE 
RANGE Home-station 
W9124R 
MICC - YUMA PROVING 
GROUND Home-station 
W90AF2 409TH CSB: PARC OFFICE 
Short-duration 
deployment 
W91QVP 413TH CSB: PARC PACIFIC 
Short-duration 
deployment 





Contracting Office ID Awarding Contracting Office Name Environment 
W56PFY 414TH CSB: RCO AFRICA 
Short-duration 
deployment 
W912SR 409TH CSB: RCO KOSOVO 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W912CL 410TH CSB: RCC AMERICAS 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W912QM 410TH CSB: RCO SOTO CANO 
Long-duration 
deployment 








W91QVN 411TH CSB: PARC OFFICE 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W912D1 408TH CSB: RCC-KUWAIT 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W56KGZ 408TH CSB: RCC-OIR 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W912D2 408TH CSB: RCC-QATAR 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W913FT 410TH CSB: RCO BOGOTA 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W91WRZ 410TH CSB: RCO GTMO 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W90VN8 411TH CSB: RCO CASEY 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W90VN9 411TH CSB: RCO DAEGU 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W90VN7 411TH CSB: RCO KUNSAN 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W90VN6 411TH CSB: RCO OSAN 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W56SGK ACC AFG: CAPITAL 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W56JSM ACC AFG: CASBC (INACTIVE) 
Long-duration 
deployment 
W91B4N ACC AFG: EAST 
Long-duration 
deployment 










Contracting Office ID Awarding Contracting Office Name Environment 
W919QC 












































W5KA4N ACC AFG: RCC WEST (INACTIVE) 
Long-duration 
deployment 
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APPENDIX C. TRACEABILITY MATRIX TASK JUSTIFICATION 
● Task 301 Review Requirement Packet 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Yes, FAR Part 7 & 11 as reviewing a 
packet is part of agency support and planning. 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Same as above. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Same as above. 
o Modification (MOD): Yes, FAR Part 11. Contracting officer do not 
conduct acquisition planning as modifications are based on existing 
contracts. 
● Task 302 Conduct Market Research 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Yes, as required in FAR part 10. 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Same as above. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): No as per FAR part 10.01(v) 
because TO/DOs are an existing requirement, and contracting officers 
only need to conduct market research for non-commercial items (which is 
not an OCS requirement). 
o Modification (MOD): Yes, as per FAR part 17.203, determining fair & 
reasonable pricing when exercising options. 
● · Task 303 Conduct Acquisition Planning 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Yes, as FAR 7 requires it. 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Same as above. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Not required, as per FAR part 
7.102 
o Modification (MOD): Same as above. 
● · Task 304 Solicit Competition 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Yes, FAR Part 6 requires competition 
unless authorized in FAR Part 6.2 or 6.3. 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): See above. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes, see above. Solicit 
Competition requires that you do the work for a competitive solicitation 
for services, supply, and construction. From the data, it is impossible to 
tell if a contract is a sole source; therefore, the capstone study will count 
all TO/DO contracts as competitive. 
o Modification (MOD): No, FAR Part 6 does not list it as a requirement in 
FAR Part 43.9000. 
 
● Task 305 Receive Solicitation Response and Evaluate Offers  
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Yes, as per FAR part 13.106-2 for 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) procurement and FAR part 15 
requires it. 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Same as above 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): From our data, we are going to 
assume every order is a single task award contract. There is no second 
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round of Competition. From the data, the capstone cannot tell who is 
competitive or not.  
o Modification (MOD): FAR Part 43.103 supports all types of modification 
responses below. All types with “yes” responses are bilateral and require 
response by the contractor and evaluation by the contracting activity. 
▪ additional work (yes) 
▪ change order (yes) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (yes) 
▪ definitize letter contract (yes) 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (no) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (yes) some contracting actions will need, 
and others will not. For this capstone study, we will assume all 
supplemental agreements will require.  
▪ Termination for Cause (no) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) 
▪ Termination for Default (no) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 306 Prepare Award Synopsis – Notify Unsuccessful Offerors 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): FAR 15 states that the government only 
has to notify if over the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT). The 
capstone will assume the SAT is $150,000 for all years, although the SAT 
has changed.  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): same as above 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): none 
o Modification (MOD): none 
 
● Task 307 Prepare Contract Award 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): None 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Yes 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes 
o Modification (MOD): None 
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● Task 308 Conduct a Post Award Orientation  
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): None 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Yes. According to the Job Aid, an 
organization will determine if it needs an organization.  
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes, same as above 
o Modification (MOD): It depends 
▪ additional work (yes) 
▪ change order (yes) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (no) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (yes) 
▪ Termination for Cause (no) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (no) 
▪ Termination for Default (no) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 309 Train and Manage Contracting Officer Representatives 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): A BOV is not a contract, and by law, a 
COR only exists when there is a contract. A BOV is an agreement.  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Yes, for service and constructions. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes, service, and construction.  
o Modification (MOD): None. The COR already exists under the original 
contract.  
 
● Task 310 Issue Task Order/Delivery Order or Blanket Purchase Order 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO):  
o Modification (MOD): 
 
● Task 311 Exercise a Contract Options 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): none 
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o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): none 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): none 
o Modification (MOD): Yes, only for exercised a contract option.  
 
● Task 312 Monitor Contract Performance 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): There is no performance on an 
agreement.  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Yes. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes 
o Modification (MOD): 
▪ additional work (yes) 
▪ change order (yes) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (no) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (yes) 
▪ Termination for Cause (no) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (no) 
▪ Termination for Default (no) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 313 Process Document for Payment 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Yes 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Yes 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes 
o Modification (MOD): No. The capstone study will assume each contract 
has one instance of payment. With the limited information on the data, 
there is no telling how many payments  
 
● Task 314: Modify a contract 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): No  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): No  
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): No  
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o Modification (MOD): Yes, any contract modified performed under all 
tasks under modification contract.  
 
● Task 315: Perform Contract Closeout 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): No  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): No 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): No  
o Modification (MOD): The capstone study will assume the contract 
closeout will only. The team counted the data multiple times for one 
action.  
▪ additional work (no) 
▪ change order (no) 
▪ closeout (yes) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (yes) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (no) 
▪ Termination for Cause (yes) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) 
▪ Termination for Default (yes) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 316: Process an Unauthorized Commitment 
o The data set does not support to identify by simply evaluating a 
contract when contracting personnel perform an organization task.  
 
● Task 401: Process a Contract Claim 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): None 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): None 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): None 
o Modification (MOD): Claim is only existing contracts and not against a 
new contracting action. A KO would modify a contract to perform a claim.  
▪ Additional work (yes), not always. The Capstone Study will count 
all; therefore, there will be an overcount.  
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▪ change order (no) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (no) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (no) 
▪ Termination for Cause (no) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) required to make the contractor 
whole.  
▪ Termination for Default (no) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 402: Terminate a Contract 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): None 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): None 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): None 
o Modification (MOD): To terminate a contract, a KO must do a 
modification.  
▪ additional work (no)  
▪ change order (no) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (yes) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (no) 
▪ Termination for Cause (yes) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) 
▪ Termination for Default (yes) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
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● Task 403: Process a Contract Protest 
o There is not enough data to support when a KO experiences a protest with 
the data set. Whenever there is a new contracting action, there is a 
possibility for a protest.  
 
● Task 404: Identify Supported Units  
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): Every time a KO does a contracting 
action, a KO knows they have provided unit support.  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): same as above 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): same as above 
o Modification (MOD):  
▪ additional work (yes)  
▪ change order (yes) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (yes) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (yes) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (yes) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (yes) 
▪ Termination for Cause (yes) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) 
▪ Termination for Default (yes) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 405: Train Supported Units 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): None 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): just for service and construction 
because you are going to have Contracting Officer Representative (COR) 
in the organization monitoring the contractor’s performance.  
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): same as above 
o Modification (MOD):  
▪ additional work (yes)  
▪ change order (yes) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
58 
▪ Exercise an Option (yes) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (yes)  
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (yes) 
▪ Termination for Cause (no) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (no) 
▪ Termination for Default (no) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 406: Advise Supported Units Regarding Acquisition Matters 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): KO advises units during the planning 
phase for operational and training missions. KO will maintain 
communication with the unit during contract development. All pre-award 
contracting actions.  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): same as above 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): same as above 
o Modification (MOD):  
▪ additional work (yes)  
▪ change order (yes) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (no) 
▪ definitize letter contract (no) 
▪ Exercise an Option (yes) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (yes) 
▪ Novation Agreement (no) 
▪ Other Admin Action (yes) 
▪ Representation (no) 
▪ Supplemental Agreement (yes) 
▪ Termination for Cause (yes) 
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) 
▪ Termination for Default (yes) 
▪ Vender Address Change (no) 
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (no) 
 
● Task 407: Review Operational Contract Support Plan 
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o The capstone team does not have enough data to support when the 
contracting tasks occurs. A KO may review several plans, but not all plans 
result in a contracting action.  
 
● Task 408: Train, Appoint and Manage Field Ordering Officer (FOO) 
o The capstone team does not have enough data to support when the 
contracting tasks occurs. 
 
● Task 409: Utilize a Standard Form 44, Purchase Order-Invoice Voucher 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): none 
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Only use for supplies and services 
capped at a certain dollar value. SF 44 is for one-time purchases and not 
done on other contract types. The capstone group will the micro-purchase 
threshold of $30,000 according to class deviation 2018-O0018 and FAR 
13.201 (g). The contract action will only occur in long-duration 
deployment and short-duration deployment environments. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): none 
o Modification (MOD): none  
 
● Task 410: Develop and Manage a Procurement Instrument Identification Number 
(PIIN) Log 
o The PIIN is the KOs internal tracker of contracting actions. There is not 
enough data to support when and if a KO is completing a PIIN log. There 
is no contract action that will correlate to Task 410.  
 
● Task 411: Advise Supported Units Regarding Acquisition Matters 
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV): A BOV is not a contract and by law a 
COR only exist when there is a contract. A BOV is an agreement.  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): Yes, for service and constructions. 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): Yes, service and construction.  
o Modification (MOD): None. The COR already exists under the original 
contract. 
 
● Task 412: Conduct Vendor Education  
o Basic Ordering Vehicle (BOV):  
o Contract/ Purchase Order (K/PO): same as above 
o Task Order/ Delivery Order (TO/DO): same as above 
o Modification (MOD): A KO will require to educate the contractor in 
certain contracting action.  
▪ additional work (no)  
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▪ change order (no) 
▪ closeout (no) 
▪ definitize change order (yes) Before the KO verifies the contract, 
the KO has to educate the contractor on expectations.  
▪ definitize letter contract (yes) same as above 
▪ Exercise an Option (no) 
▪ Funding Only (no) 
▪ Legal K cancellation (yes) The KO must explain the government 
contract cancellation process to contractor.  
▪ Novation Agreement (yes)When the contractor changes its 
company name, the KO must educate the business on the 
additional measures to complete the process.  
▪ Other Admin Action (no) 
▪ Representation (yes) When a contractor changes its business size 
and business category, the KO must educate the contractor on 
requirements to the government based on the category and size of 
the business.  
▪ Supplemental Agreement (no) 
▪ Termination for Cause (yes) The KO must educate the contractor 
whenever the government terminates a contract.  
▪ Termination for Convenience (yes) 
▪ Termination for Default (yes) 
▪ Vender Address Change (yes) KO must educate the contractor 
when it changes its address to ensure the contractor successfully 
completes all steps necessary.  
▪ Vendor DUNS Chane (yes) same as above 
 
● Task 413: Prepare for Deployment 
o There is not enough information in the data set to determine when the 




APPENDIX D. R CODE 
R version 3.6.1 (2019-07-05)  
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